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Editorial on the Research Topic
Mental State Understanding: Individual Differences in Typical and Atypical Development
We often refer to mental states such as intentions, desires, and beliefs to explain and predict
our own behavior and that of others. Mental state understanding develops from infancy through
adolescence and adulthood. A deeper understanding of influencing developmental factors may be
obtained by studying individual differences in typical and atypical populations.
The current Research Topic addresses several topics about mental state understanding and
development in childhood. It is organized into three sections, comprising 18 papers in total.
The first section addresses the development of social cognition in typical populations through
seven papers. Different from most research on Theory of Mind (ToM) that commonly focuses
on age-related changes, Blijd-Hoogewys and van Geert investigated whether there occur non-
linearities during ToM development in childhood. Within an overall developmental trend
that leveled off toward the age of 10 years, results showed two non-linearities suggesting a
developmental shift in ToM understanding: a stagnation at the age of around 4 years and 8 months
and a dip at the age of 6 years to six and a half years.
Four papers concern influencing social factors on children’s ToM. Rosso and Airaldi showed
that maternal reflective functioning (but not maternal attachment security) predicted their
preadolescent child’s reflective functioning, and that maternal ability to metalize mixed-ambivalent
mental states predicted the corresponding ability in their child. While maternal education and
linguistic competence are well researched influencing factors (e.g., NICHD HLB, 1998; Pons
et al., 2003; Sammons et al., 2004), Bulgarelli and Molina showed that preschooler’s linguistic
competence mediated the effect of maternal education. Moreover, center-base care in the first 3
years of life eliminated the effect of maternal education, suggesting a protective role of center-base
care for children with less educated mothers. Göbel et al. assessed the relation between emotion
understanding and internalizing and externalizing behavior in 7- to 10-year-old children in a
non-clinical, community sample. Inconsistent with prior research, the overall level of emotion
understanding, comprising nine components, was not related to externalizing symptoms, but
correlated positively with elevated levels of somatic complaints and anxious/depressed symptoms.
Also, and specifically, higher levels of social withdrawal were associated with worse performance
in understanding emotions elicited by reminders. Pinto et al. showed that joint narratives only
improve 6- to 10-year-old’s children’s mental state talk performances when children were at the
moment of initial elaboration or emergence of mental state talk, and when intersubjectivity levels
were high, that is, when children produced more utterances to orchestrate and regulate the dialog.
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Other two papers concern possible implications of ToM
development on social interaction. Bosco and Gabbatore
suggested that first-order ToM may play a causal role in
explaining 3- to 8-year-old children’s performance in handling
pragmatic phenomena, namely sincere and deceitful speech acts.
As to children’s cognitive performances in social interaction
regarding spatial tasks, Viana et al. showed that 5- to 9-year-
old children’s ToM was a better predictor of their spatial
performances in a dyadic condition than their age, gender, and
spatial performances in an individual setting.
Overall, the papers regarding typically developing children
present some interesting ideas about the development of
understanding mental states. This competence proves to be
linked with different aspects of development, at social, cognitive,
and relational levels: Rosso and Airaldi showed that only
maternal reflective functioning, and not maternal attachment
security, predicted children’s mental state understanding; in turn,
the paper of Bulgarelli andMolina confirmed the role of language
and that of Pinto et al. the role of communicative context
on children’s ToM. Understanding mental states shows to be
a complex ability that involves different functions and effects
different aspects of development. Finally, the contribution of
Blijd-Hoogewys and van Geert presented an interesting new
approach to the study of ToM development that has implications
for the debate whether this development may be stage-like or
continuous.
The second section of this Research Topic encompasses
nine papers that address the development of mental states
understanding and its correlates in atypical populations. The
possibility to compare results derived from studies carries out
with typical and atypical populations is of key importance. In fact,
similarities and differences in typical and atypical development
can shed light on the processes at the base of the ability to
understand, attribute and interpret mental states.
Lábadi and Beke’s study concerned the role of structural
connectivity across the hemispheres in neurodevelopmental
disorders. They showed that 6- to 8-year-old children with
agenesis of the corpus callosum exhibited mild impairments in
recognizing emotions and in understanding theory of mind, and
also showed more behavioral problems than control children
matched by IQ and sociodemographic variables.
White et al. showed differential effects of social exclusion
on children’s usage of their capacity to understand mental
states in relation to anxiety. After children were non-
accidentally excluded in a virtual game, typically developing 5-
year-olds’ (Study 1) completion of peer-scenario stories were
characterized by portraying story-characters more strongly as
intentional agents, with use of more mental state language, and
more between-character affiliation. Differently, 4- to 8-year-old
children with anxiety disorder (Study 2) told stories in which
story-characters exhibited less intentionality and less use of
mental-state language. Thus, while exclusion may induce young
children to mentalize, and thus to more effectively reconnect
with others, excessive anxiety may impair this usage of controlled
mentalizing.
The study by Amadó et al. investigated the relation between
social cognition and executive functioning in children with
Down Syndrome (DS). Children with DS were delayed in social
cognition and in executive functioning, with unequal impairment
of different functions. Moreover, working memory explained a
higher amount of variability in social cognition performance than
in typically developing children matched by age.
Implicit mentalizing consists of a spontaneous anticipation of
an agent’s false belief-based action that can be observed through
anticipatory looking biases in tasks where eye movements are
assessed. Using eye tracking devices, Schuwerk et al. showed
that implicit mentalizing persists over infancy up to childhood
in typical population; on the contrary, children with Autistic
Spectrum Disorder (ASD) appeared to be impaired in such
skill, even when their performance in the explicit tasks were
similar to the matched control group. The results of this study–
intact explicit mentalizing, impaired implicit mentalizing and no
relation between that and executive function in children with
ASD−support theories that propose two dissociable mentalizing
systems.
The review by Margoni and Surian and its corrigendum
discussed the idea that impairment inmental state understanding
is the main factor explaining why children with ASD face
difficulties in moral judgements: in fact, these children mainly
rely on actions consequences and other external factors rather
than on the agents’ mental states when solving moral reasoning
tasks.
Due to restricted discussion of abstract concepts, and to a
possible to mismatch between language capabilities of children
and their parents, the literature reported that deaf and hard-
of-hearing signing children can display delays in mental states
development (Peterson, 2009). Wang et al. compared children
with a cochlear implant or a hearing aid with normally hearing
participantsmatched by age and gender and showed that children
with cochlear implants and hearing aids were developmentally
delayed not only in verbally labeling the facial expressions
of happiness, sadness, anger, and fear, but also in a non-
verbal emotion-matching task. Holmer et al. showed that deaf
and hard-of-hearing signing children were delayed in ToM
tasks performances; only three of them have been exposed to
sign language since birth. ToM was associated with reading
comprehension and workingmemory, but not with sign language
comprehension.
The inter-relation between language and ToM has been
clarified in a meta-analysis by Milligan et al. (2007). Deepening
this relation in children with Specific Language Impairment
(SLI) is interesting, because some studies found delays in this
population while others did not (Perner et al., 1989; Shields
et al., 1996; Bulgarelli and Molina, 2013). In the review by
Vissers and Koolen preschoolers with SLI appeared to be
impaired both in cognitive ToM (imitation, joint attention, false
belief understanding) and in affective ToM (recognizing and
understanding emotions).
The review by Zmyj et al. addressed the role of joint attention
as a precursor of social cognition, focusing on pre-term born
children: they were less likely to initiate joint attention with
others and to respond to others’ attempts of engagement. The
authors suggest that these deficits in joint attention might lead to
impairments in social cognition, and in social interaction skills.
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Deficits in mental states understanding are reported for
children with different developmental disorders or impairments,
from neurological ones (agenesis of the corpus callosum),
prematurity, ASD, and personality difficulties such as anxiety.
The paper of Schuwerk et al. suggested an interesting topic
for future research: the possibility to differentiate implicit from
explicit ToM based on different results in typical and ASD
populations. On the contrary, as in typical development, the role
of language is supported also by the present studies on children
with SLI (Vissers and Koolen) and hearing impairment (Holmer
et al.; Wang et al.).
A third and final section in this Research Topic is composed
by two papers regarding evaluation and training tools. Valle
et al. presented the “Thoughts in Mind (TiM) Project” that
aimes at training mentalizing skills in adults (e.g., teachers
and parents) to positively affect children’s mentalization. They
reported first evidence of the efficacy of the training when
done with teachers: only the TiM Project training group
significantly improved in third order false belief understanding
and in two of the three components of a Mentalizing Task.
Herbort et al. presented a new tool to assess ToM, the
ToMenovela, that consists of 190 scenes depicting daily-life
situations, addressing cognitive and affective ToM, emotional
reactivity, and complex emotion judgment with respect to
Ekman’s basic emotions. First results on the use of the test with
neurologically and psychiatrically healthy adults were reported.
The tool proposed by Herbort et al. is very interesting because
tools assessing adults’ ToM are very scarce. Valle et al. proposed
a teacher’s training effective in improving children’s abilities:
a relevant aspect of research in mental states understanding
effectiveness.
The current Research Topic addressed the development of
mental state understanding in children with typical and atypical
population, and reported new suggestions about the way to
evaluate it and to support it through training. The presented
frame was multifaceted. In respect to typical populations, the role
of maternal reflective functioning, language, communication,
and educational contexts has been deepened; and the association
with internalizing/externalizing behaviors, performances in
spatial tasks and pragmatics has been addressed as well. As to
atypical populations, deficits in mental states understanding were
reported for children with different developmental disorders
or impairments, as the agenesis of the corpus callosum,
Down Syndrome, prematurity, ASD, hearing impairment and
personality difficulties such as anxiety.
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